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From Custom to Law – Hayek revisited 
 
 
 
 
Guido Rossi* and Salvatore Spagano** 
 
The present paper combines legal history with economic theory so to explain the passage from custom to law. 
Economists have usually explained the shift from customary to statutory law (that is, from spontaneous to formal 
rules) either in terms contractualism or evolutionism. In the first case, law is the only efficient solution for a 
Hobbesian-like immanent social conflict. In the second case, customs do create an efficient enough equilibrium. 
Law comes on a later stage just to formalise an already accepted rule, vesting the custom with a formal status. 
Neither theory, however, is fully able to explain the transition from custom to law. One struggles with the very 
acceptance of customs in the first place. The other fails to provide a satisfactorily explanation of the passage from 
custom to law.  The present work seeks to reconcile the two theories by looking at the economic advantages of 
statutory law over custom. Unlike the first theory, it does not deny that customs may produce a relatively efficient 
status, but it seeks to explain why, at a certain point, customs were considered as inadequate and statutory law 
became more desirable. Our answer lies in the publication of written rules, for the presumption of knowledge it 
entails. Presumption of knowledge of the applicable rules is one of the elements that (oral) customs could not 
provide to contracts. Although somewhat neglected in many studies on customs and legislation, publication is a 
crucial element for our understanding of the passage from spontaneous custom to positive law.  
The work shall first introduce the passage from customary to statutory law in both legal and economic theories. 
Then, it will analyse the deep symmetry between the number of agents involved and the number of transactions on 
the one hand and the progressive replacement of customs with statutes on the other. The conclusions of such an 
analysis will be used to prove the crucial role played by the presumption of knowledge, which is perhaps the missing 
link between different economic theories on customs and law. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Widespread knowledge of ‘due behaviour’ allows to cope with future events with 
sufficient foreseeability. Some behaviour patterns emerge spontaneously, others are 
legally imposed. Whatever their origin, be it spontaneous or prescribed, rules improve 
exchange efficiency and so the welfare of the agents involved therein. These two 
kinds of rules derive from two cultural approaches, and ultimately from two different 
legal policy options. The scholars who investigate such rules may be grouped 
(oversimplifying a good deal) in categories ranging from contractualists to 
evolutionists. Contractualists see rules as means to an end.1 Evolutionists consider 	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1 McCormick – Tollison (1981); Voigt (1997); Buchanan (1990; 2006); Buchanan – Tullock (1965); 
Voigt (2011). 
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rules as spontaneous phenomena, whose success and diffusion depends on their 
prevailing over others.2 As no-one planned a spontaneous rule, so nobody can amend 
it: arbitrary changes would entail unforeseeable consequences. Spontaneous rules 
therefore result, so to say, in an equilibrium lacking of any sense of direction. They do 
not aim to achieve a certain result, to fulfil a particular task. Much to the contrary, 
legally imposed rules envisage a certain balance between the parties in order to 
achieve a given purpose.  
The present work shows how both kinds of rules share the common element of 
efficiency (the former as their cause, the latter as their purpose), and it envisages their 
possible integration by looking at the diffusion of behaviour mechanisms. Firstly, this 
work introduces briefly the two extremes of the economic literature on the subject of 
collective behaviour regulation. Secondly, it looks at Hayek’s problem on the 
conditions requiring the shift from spontaneous to imposed rule, and it argues that the 
main variable depends on the number of people involved. Thirdly, and lastly, it 
provides some legal examples in support of such an argument. 
 
 
 
2. Efficient rules: short overview of evolutionism and contractualism 
 
2.1 Spontaneous rules 
 
Frederick von Hayek paved the way for a theory of law understood as the 
unintentional result of the pursuing of individual aims. Hayek’s analysis of the law 
moves from the problem of the nature of the order which regulates human 
institutions:3 
 
Classical Greek was more fortunate in possessing distinct single words for the two kinds 
of order, namely taxis for a made order, such as, for example, an order of battle, and 
kosmos for a grown order, meaning originally ‘a right order in a state or a community’ 
 
Hayek’s critique of the legitimacy of ‘made orders’ moves from the rejection of the 
tendency to interpret regular behaviours as the product of a mind at work. Instead of 
considering regular conducts as the result of ‘taxis’, he argues, it is necessary to look 
at them in the same way as Darwinian scientists re-interpreted natural sciences:4  
 
The theory of evolution proper provides no more than an account of a process the 
outcome of which will depend on a very large number of particular facts, far too 
numerous for us to know in their entirety, and therefore does not lead to predictions about 
the future 
 
Just as in nature, so in law evolutionism may only help understanding the process that 
has taken place, but not to amend it:5 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Axelrod (1986); Sugden (1989); Binmore (1998); Gintis (2000); Ostrom (2000); Hodgson (2003); 
Richerson – Boyd (2005); Aoki (2007). 
3 Hayek (1983, p. 37), emphasis in original. 
4 Hayek (1983, pp. 23-24). 
5 Hayek (1983, p. 164), emphasis in original. Some hints in the same directions are already to be found 
in Adam Smith. When commenting Hume’s division of labour, Smith argued that ‘This division of 
labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, 
which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion’ Smith (2006, p. 12). 
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We have never designed our economic system. We were not intelligent enough for that. 
We have stumbled into it and it has carried us to unforeseen heights and given rise to 
ambitions which may yet lead us to destroy it 
 
Evolutionary process is blind. Chance and need alone move it. While it ensures the 
survival of the more apt rule, evolutionism does not necessarily lead to the best one. 
Provided such best rule existed, it is well possible that it never materialised. It might 
just never had the chance to appear. Behaviour patterns appear spontaneously and 
spread themselves. It is possible to track their origin and their cause, but not their end, 
for they structurally lack of any aim. Rules aim at something only when devised by 
some authority. Rules assert themselves: free interaction of individual behaviours, 
each looking after its own benefit, results in a spontaneous order. Only then the 
authority bestows its approval to that order, sanctioning it as lawful:6 
 
Factual observance of some rules no doubt preceded any deliberate enforcement  
 
 
2.2. Imposed rules 
 
Imposed rules lie at the other extreme of the economic literature on collective 
behaviour regulation. Although contractual law-making (which results in imposed 
rules) stands in clear opposition to spontaneous legal evolution, they both share the 
same methodological individualism. The different approach depends on the 
possibility of choosing a law. Such a choice presupposes the full understanding of a 
legal system. For Hayek (and, with him, evolutionary scholars) this is not possible. 
For Buchanan and the contractualists it is both possible and necessary. 
 
Buchanan moves from the same starting point as Hobbes – mistrust leading to social 
unrest:7 
 
a natural distribution will emerge from actual or potential conflict. […] In attaining his 
share in this natural distribution, each person finds it necessary to invest effort (time and 
energy) in predatory and/or defence activity 
 
For Buchanan complete lack of social unrest is unattainable. Paucity of resources and 
absence of laws (or of enforceable laws) would necessarily lead to conflict. The only 
possible solution is the forcible imposition of rules, so to correct and amend 
spontaneous behaviours.8 Constitutional Economics is ultimately the research of the 
most efficient rule to order social behaviours. Contractualism and evolutionary theory 
both ultimately stem from the same individualistic methodology, and yet they reach 
entirely opposite results. While contractualism seeks to improve the original (and, in 
its view, highly inefficient) spontaneous order, evolutionism denies the very 
possibility to amend it. At first sight the two theories appear one the nemesis of the 
other. They both move from extremely aprioristic positions, irreconcilably distant 
from each other. The present work would suggest the contrary – contractualism may 
be considered as complementary to spontaneous law-making.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Hayek (1983, p. 96). 
7 Buchanan (2006, p. 28). 
8 Cf. Buchanan (1990). 
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3. A third way 
 
Surprisingly enough, Hayek did appreciate the merits of intentionally amending 
spontaneous rules. He allowed such a possibility, but markedly narrowed its scope:9 
 
The fact that all law arising out of the endeavour to articulate rules of conduct will of 
necessity possess some desirable properties not necessarily possessed by the commands 
of a legislator does not mean that in other respects such law may not develop in very 
undesirable directions, and that when this happens correction by deliberate legislation 
may not be the only practicable way out. For a variety of reasons the spontaneous process 
of growth may lead into an impasse from which it cannot extricate itself by its own forces 
or which it will at least not correct quickly enough. […] The fact that law that has evolved 
in this way has certain desirable properties does not prove that it will always be good law 
or even that some of its rules may not be very bad. It therefore does not mean that we can 
altogether dispense with legislation 
 
The above passage might look somewhat perfunctory. In a few lines Hayek allowed 
what he had strongly denied throughout his entire legal theory – the legitimacy and 
the merits of imposed rules. Moreover, Hayek does not explain what such an ‘impasse 
from which [spontaneous law-making] cannot extricate itself’ may be, nor even the 
desirable speed at which the system should overcome it. Furthermore, Hayek does not 
say what kind of authoritative remedy should be applied, and what conditions should 
accompany the remedy itself. All such questions find a clear answer in the 
contractualist theory. And yet Hayek is silent on each and every of them. His silence 
depends on his reluctance to acknowledge expressly the need to support spontaneous 
rules with imposed ones. Reluctant as he is, Hayek confines the possibility of 
deadlocks in the development of spontaneous legal order to a few lines in which he 
considers them as possible but highly improbable. And yet, the possibility of such 
deadlocks betrays the limits of Hayek’s own theory, or at least disproves its self-
sufficiency.  
 
Our question is when exactly the State ought to intervene in a spontaneous order, 
when it should change its attitude – from a negative duty (duty not to interfere) to a 
positive one (duty to intervene). Hayek leaves the question unanswered, ducking 
entirely the problem. He merely acknowledges the possibility that spontaneous 
development might lead to undesirable results. If this happens, it is desirable that the 
authority create laws. But when does it occur, and why? And what should the features 
of such a legislative intervention be?  
 
The present work argues that efficiency valuation between spontaneous and imposed 
rules should also take into account the relationship between number of people and the 
speed at which a rule spreads. It is submitted that there is at least a quantitative 
variable of spontaneous development which might require authoritative intervention 
for the sake of efficiency: the number of individuals affected by the rule. With the 
increase of agents, spontaneous order tends to become inefficient. The probability that 
this might happen increases with the rise in number of the agents operating within that 
order. When this occurs, imposed rules become desirable. There are two reasons for 
this. Firstly, the increase of the recipients of a rule entails a similar increase in the 
time needed for the last of such recipients to become aware of the rule. This may 
result in long delays for the rule to be operative and to regulate exchanges. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Hayek (1983, p. 96), emphasis added. 
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outcome is a significant loss of wealth. Secondly, it is well possible that the 
spontaneous order would produce several rules for the same situation, and not just 
one. And yet a single rule for each kind of transaction is more efficient than a 
plurality. The more people in a group, the more the chances of a plurality of rules for 
the same situation. Obviously enough, this plurality of different rules would 
significantly decrease the total welfare. Those individuals who follow a same rule 
extract the maximum benefit from exchanges among themselves. Those who follow 
different rules, on the contrary, will have to suffer additional costs to coordinate 
themselves in order to be able to exchange. 
 
Length of time for a rule to become known to all the members of a group and 
potential conflict among several rules are probably the reasons for Hayek’s ‘impasse’. 
When considerable time is needed for a rule to be known within a group, and more 
rules ‘emerge’ to regulate the same case, then an intervention of the authority is 
needed to impose the same rule to all the members of the group. It is therefore 
reasonable to envisage some threshold in the number of individuals within the group. 
When their number reaches the threshold, the costs of the ‘impasse’ might exceed the 
advantages of spontaneous development of rules. It is then that imposed rules would 
become efficient, for a simple cost/benefit valuation.  
 
Law lies in between evolution and authority.  Law reacts to Hayek’s impasse with the 
publication of a rule. Publication is often neglected in orthodox legal theory, but it is 
crucial to understand the passage from spontaneous to imposed rules in the 
development of a legal system. Publicising due behaviour renders it public – that is, 
presumptively known to all recipients in the moment of its publication. Obviously, a 
similar presumption could not arise within spontaneous legal evolution, for it is 
plainly false. Imposed law presumes knowledge of its rules in that it does not excuse 
their ignorance. But this is precisely the advantage of publication: to impose 
knowledge of due behaviour to all agents within a system instantaneously. This way 
imposed law overcomes the impasse described (in a rather obscure way) in Hayek. 
The advantage of publication does not mean that imposed law is always preferable to 
spontaneous law. Rather, imposed law is more efficient than spontaneous law when a 
cost-benefit valuation would yield a Paretian improvement for the commonwealth.10 
 
 
4. Custom as a (spontaneous) source of law  
In legal terms, Hayekian spontaneous order is nothing but customary law.11 The 
following pages provide some empirical confirmations of the primacy (in time) of 
spontaneous custom over positive law, and most of all of the reason for their 
combination. When and why did spontaneous behaviour patterns (i.e. custom) give 
way to imposed rules (i.e. positive law)? 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Obviously enough, no such valuation would be needed in case of conflicting spontaneous rules and 
infinite temporal horizon. In that case, imposed law would yield a Paretian improvement whatever the 
cost to adopt it. This cost would be compensated by the permanent gain of advantages which would 
never be achieved otherwise. 
11 We are referring to customs regulating cases not regulated by the law (consuetudo praeter legem). 
Other kinds of customs may regulate situations already provided for by the law, hereby clashing with it 
(consuetudo contra legem) or endorsing it (consuetudo secundum legem). Such other kinds of custom 
however presuppose the existence of positive law, and so do not represent Hayek’s idea of spontaneous 
order which develops in its absence.  
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4.1. Custom in State law 
 
Custom is the only source of law not produced by the lawmaker which is 
acknowledged by the legal system. National law allows custom but places it into a 
residual category, the lowest grade within the legal hierarchy.12 Customs grow up 
spontaneously – that is, without the control of the authority. As such, modern legal 
systems, based as they are on positive commands, seek to limit the scope of custom. 
In modern law, custom applies only to situations in which no legal command (either 
of statutory or jurisprudential nature) can be found.13 What is important to our 
purposes is that such customs, narrow in scope as they may be, are acknowledged by 
the legal system after their making. A legal system may acknowledge some usages 
and lend them some (limited) authority – just enough to compensate for the absence 
of a formal rule, so to ‘fill the gap’ in the system. But the usage pre-exists to the legal 
system which acknowledges and accepts it. Some customs have been in existence for 
a very long time, going through different historical periods and so different legal 
systems. In such cases, the longevity of the custom probably depended on its 
acknowledgement (and so enforcement) by the different legal systems: enforcing the 
custom meant also sanctioning its violation. 14  Even within purely ‘contractual’ 
systems such as the modern legal systems, therefore, some room is left to spontaneous 
regulation of collective behaviours. Within such systems, customary law is the link 
connecting spontaneous and imposed rules. 
 
 
4.2 Custom in Public International law 
 
Marginalised as it is by State law, customary law enjoys a pre-eminent rank when it 
comes to regulate the interaction between different States – that is, in Public 
International law.15 International custom, as unwritten law, is often opposed to the 
‘law of the treatises’, the ‘contractual’ side of International law. Whenever a State has 
not underwritten a specific international treaty, or not treaty regulates a specific issue, 
international custom fills the gap in International law. At the same time, the 
exponential growth of the number of international treatises and international 
institutions over the last century, coupled with the unprecedented increase in the 
number of active international players, has progressively reduced the scope for 
international custom. The growth of international relations and the increase in scope 
and aims of supranational organisations both entail a higher need to plan and foresee 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Apparently, such a statement begs the question about the customary nature of common law. The 
issue is too complex to be dealt with in the present essay. Suffices to say, to our purposes, that the 
association common law – customary law is ambiguous at best, if not just wrong. For a first 
introduction on this centuries-old ambiguity see Cromartie (2007), Ibbetson (2007) and moreover 
Baker (2001, pp. 59-90). 
13 For the role of custom in primitive legal systems see (Elias, 1956; Hoebel, 2006). Obviously enough, 
these studies apply the term ‘custom’ in a very different context. And yet, they seem to strengthen the 
impression that the scope of custom is inversely proportional to the advancement of a legal system. The 
less sophisticated the legal system, in other words, the more the room for custom, and vice-versa.  
14 On the necessity of sanctioning the violation of a spontaneous custom see the debate between Robert 
Sugden and Ken Binmore (Binmore, 1998; Sugden 2001; Binmore 2001). 
15 For instance, Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states that ‘The Court, 
whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, 
shall apply: [...] b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’. See further 
Bederman (2010, pp.135-167). 
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behaviours. In such circumstances it is but reasonable for a non-written law to 
progressively withdraw in favour of a written legal system.  
All this makes International law a good example of what argued in this paper. 
Because of the limited number of agents, the initial relations between States develop 
spontaneously and tend to crystallise into customary rules. Later on, the increase in 
the number of participants and the consequent risk of developing conflicting customs 
require some degree of coordination among spontaneous rules. This can only be 
achieved by agreement and so contractually.  
 
 
4.3 Mercantile custom: London and Antwerp in the sixteenth century 
 
Contemporary examples of customary law used by large groups are relatively few. 
There are too many agents, and exchanges are easy, immediate and virtually without 
borders. Going back in time, however, it is easier to find examples in support of the 
primacy (in time) of spontaneous legislative process. In such examples authoritative 
interventions occurred only because of external circumstances, which made 
economically convenient to move from custom to law.  
Our example is about insurance customs. Accurate enough data are available only 
from the late fifteenth century, which signalled also the beginning of the great 
codification of customary law. 16  During the late Middle Ages customs were 
progressively written down. Writing down customs meant crystallising a rule so far 
held as compulsory but never properly formalised. It fulfilled the very same function 
as the one we are arguing: entailing the presumption of knowledge. ‘Publication’ 
originally meant exactly what the word suggests: making something public. As such, 
it required just printing out and spreading a document, reading aloud its content in a 
crowded square, or posting it up in busy venues.17 A particularly interesting example 
is the insurance code of the Spanish Consulate in Bruges. The Code was published 
(that is, printed and circulated) in 1569, and it was written both in Spanish and in 
French so to ensure a wider audience. At the end of its 147 articles, the Code read:18 
 
in order that our subjects and any other who want to know the content of such 
ordinances may know, read and understand them, it is ordered that the above 
ordinances be printed in our Spanish language and be translated and published in 
the French language at the same time. Upon printing the ordinances, they shall be 
at disposal of this nation [i.e. the Spanish merchants within the Consulate], so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The most famous case is that of northern France, which started with the Ordonnance of Montil-lez-
tours of 1454 (although it was completed only in 1583).  
17 ‘Laws and edicts must be promulgated and published in a public venue, through the crier’s voice 
[…] Sometimes with a horn, as in Naples and in the District of Paris […] At the sound of the horn the 
people gather together, and then the law is published, so that in the city of Naples laws and pragmatics 
are published in a large square and before the nobles, where a large concourse of citizen and people 
gather together. Hence, ecclesiastical constitutions and the like are often published in solemn Masses, 
during the preaching, and on market-days […] the text of the law is posted up in crossroads and in the 
main places of the city […] before everybody’s eyes, so to be read out. Borrello (1621, pp. 413-414, 
nn. 3-4, 6-7), our translation. 
18 Verlinden (1950, p. 126), our translation, emphasis added. The Spanish text, identic to the French, is 
published by the same Verlinden (1947b, pp. 179-180). See also the Preamble to the Ordinances: ‘We, 
the Consuls, desiring that our subjects suffer no more frauds or abuses for lack of understanding of 
those usages and customs, have deemed good […] to establish and write down the above ordinances 
and institutes, so that from now on our subjects may know and understand how insurances work, both 
when they underwrite and when they take out a policy in this city of Bruges’, transcription in Verlinden 
(1950, p. 60), our translation; Spanish text in Verlinden (1947a, p. 162).  
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that anyone may ask me, the Secretary, or my successor, for a copy thereof […] 
To make sure that our subjects have time enough to be aware and duly informed, 
it is ordered that these ordinances will be in force on the first day of January of 
the year of our Lord Jesus Christ’s Nativity 1569 [1 January 1570]  
 
 
Commercial customs were usually written down by mercantile corporations, the 
universitates mercatorum. Public authority often ratified such transcriptions. 19 
Insurance customs, however, had been used for some centuries. Why transcribing so 
many of them right in that period? While we cannot put forward strictly causal 
relations, we might offer a conjecture. The rapid increase in publication of mercantile 
customs starts with the intensifying of mercantile (particularly maritime) exchanges 
and the increase in the routes’ length.20 
From the late fifteenth century Antwerp grew exponentially, to the point of becoming 
the main commercial gateway of northern Europe during the sixteenth century. 
Antwerp’s growth attracted an increasing number of merchants from many different 
areas – and so applying different customary rules. In a short while, the presence of 
several customs incompatible with each other became less and less sustainable (that 
is, too expensive in terms of transaction costs) for the mercantile community at 
large.21 The above-mentioned insurance code of the Spanish Consulate of Bruges 
(whose members were mostly resident in Antwerp) explains that:22 
 
The policies stipulated so far stated that the insurance was made according to the usage and 
customs of the street of London and the Bourse of Antwerp. However, such usage and 
customs are not written, and there is no-one who knows them 
 
 
It might be interesting to note how the intensification of mercantile exchanges and the 
increase in the routes’ length both grew with a similar, and extremely rapid, trend 
right during the time in which oral customs gave way to written ones. In writing down 
their customs, merchants had the chance to select them, so to decide which one to 
abide. Among merchants, abiding by the rules was strictly observed because of the 
importance of good faith in transactions. Invoking personal ignorance of a document 
printed, distributed and most of all posted up in venues institutionally used for 
exchanges (which were already called ‘bourses’) was universally held as contrary to 
good faith. Such documents, therefore, fulfilled a three-fold task: coordinating, 
spreading and legitimising the expected behaviour.  
 
It is not only the increase of agents and the consequent growth of exchanges that 
strain a custom. As mentioned above, spontaneous order may not be able to solve 
conflicting rules. This deadlock is more frequent when different and already 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See for instance the Ordinances of the Consulate of Burgos (1538, 1546 and 1582), of Seville (1556), 
and of Bilbao (1520, 1531 and 1560). 
20 Cf. first of all Braudel (1966, vol. I). 
21 Goris (1925, pp. 59-67, 178-184); Genard (1882, pp. 195-196); Guiard (1972, vol. I, pp. 121-127). 
Already in 1550-51 the Spanish merchants residing in Antwerp sought to separate themselves form the 
general Consulate of Bruges in order to publish their own customs and solve (by contractual means) the 
growing impasse. Archivo General de Simancas, Estado, leg. 536, transcription in Coronas Gonzales 
(1984, p. 388). 
22 Prologue to the Ordinances of the Spanish Consulate in Bruges of 1570, transcription in Verlinden 
(1950, p. 60), our translation. Spanish text transcribed in Verlinden (1947a, p. 162). 
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developed customs meet. The answer to such a Hayekian impasse has often been 
contractual, and it is frequently attested in legal proceedings.   
A typical case was the enquête par turbe.23 The turbe was a gathering of the most 
representative members of a community (originally, the elders), summoned to 
ascertain some particular facts so as to solve a legal dispute. The turbe is a very 
ancient practice,24 and its link with the modern jury is quite probable. Among 
merchants, the importance of the turbe grew proportionally to the demand for clarity. 
Whenever it was not clear which rule to apply to a particular transaction, a group of 
merchants (usually the most experienced and trustworthy) gathered together so to find 
out the customary rule applicable to the case. Finding out the custom often meant in 
fact choosing in between the customs invoked by the parties. Thus, often the 
merchants gathered in the turbe ended up deciding whether, according to their own 
experience, the applicable rule was the one invoked by the plaintiff or that supported 
by the defendant. This way the conflict among customs was solved in favour of the 
customary rule used by the majority among the community.25 In Antwerp, the first 
evidence of mercantile turben dates back to the late fifteenth century,26 and so right at 
the beginning of the great expansion of the city. This seems hardly fortuitous: 
attracting merchants of different regions and nationalities meant also attracting 
different and often opposite customs. Hence the need to clarify the applicable custom 
– that is, deciding which rule to apply for a certain kind of exchange within a given 
community.  
Turben were expensive, first of all because of the organisational costs they entailed. It 
was not always possible to gather a turbe for each single dispute. Another means to 
achieve the same result was to rely on the interest of the parties to a dispute to prove 
their case. In this case it was up to the parties to gather evidence about the 
applicability of a custom within the community, not to the community itself. In the 
1570s London, such a means was called (in a somewhat derogatory way) perrera. 
Perrera was a different procedure to reach the same end as the turbe: contractual 
coordination of conflicting usages. In case of dispute on the (customary) applicability 
of a certain clause in a mercantile contract, each party sought to obtain the highest 
possible number of underwritings from fellow merchants declaring that they knew of 
the clause and used it routinely (that is, customarily), or that they never heard of it.27 
Obviously enough, the perrera shows the most common downside of any contractual 
approach: self-interest. Sometimes, a merchant underwrote a perrera not because he 
was truly familiar with the clause and used it himself, but just to help out a colleague 
who would then owe him a favour. It was well possible that the underwriter would 
have needed some signatures in support of his own contract later on. Signing a false 
perrera was therefore a good way to ensure support for one’s own future disputes.28 
This ‘exchange of favours’ verged into the absurd when a same merchant underwrote 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Waelkens (1985, pp. 337-346). 
24 Howard Bloch (1977, pp. 121-122). 
25 Such a majority could be a simple majority, a qualified majority or even unanimity according to time 
and place. Although prima facie not strictly necessary, it would seem that the turbe procedure could be 
invoked by the party even in case of notorious custom. Poudret (1987, p. 71). 
26 de Ruysscher (2012, pp. 7, 12-13). 
27 The procedure of perrera is minutely described by an anonymous London merchant: British Library, 
MS Additional 48020, fol. 348r-348v (very probably written in January-February 1577). 
28 ‘These days men are ever assured who use always do for me and I will do for thee’, ibid., fol. 348v. 
The same problem is attested in the insurance Ordinances of the Consulate of Bilbao of 1560, ord. 56, 
text in Guiard y Larrauri (1972, p. 615). 
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in favour of both parties’ perreras, this way stating something and its opposite at the 
same time.29 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The present paper suggested two possible reasons for the inefficiencies of normative 
autopoiesis for which Hayek argued in favour of a legislative solution: the elevated 
number of agents and the resulting potential conflict between spontaneous rules. The 
speed at which a rule spreads among the involved agents is a crucial factor to assess 
whether an imposed rule (law) is more efficient than a spontaneous one (custom). 
Imposed rules can rely on publication and the ensuing presumption of knowledge. 
Customary rules cannot. It is therefore possible to suggest a different approach to 
customary law. While contractualists consider State law as the crystallisation of 
collective will, the most radical evolutionaries regard it as an undue constraint on the 
liberty of pursuing individual aims. Between these two extremes there is however 
room for a third way, seeking to reconcile them. Hayek’s position is the actual 
starting point of collective rules, stemming from spontaneous interaction of free 
agents: customary law. If an objection has to be raised to Hayek’s theory, it lies in his 
extremely narrow views about the later stage, that of legislation. Hayek does not leave 
enough room to law, for he considers it as a prevarication against the free will of 
individuals, their freedom to individual self-determination. The opposite is true: 
legislation can well increase the efficiency of individuals’ self-determination, 
regardless of any redistributive issue. It is therefore possible to slightly revise his 
theory on the spontaneous formation of rules. The reason for the possible impasse of 
customary law lies in the excessive length for the rule to reach the last individual 
within the community, and in the potential conflict among uncoordinated usages. To 
be more efficient than imposed rules, spontaneous rules must spread rapidly enough 
so that the loss of potential welfare does not exceed the cost resulting from 
introducing, publishing and enforcing the imposed rule.  
Some empirical evidence seemingly in favour of our thesis was found in both 
contemporary and historical legal systems. As contemporary examples, we looked at 
the (residual) role of custom in State law, and most of all at Public International law. 
There (much to the contrary of State law) custom comes before law. As an historical 
example, we hinted at the passage from oral to written customary law. Such a passage 
is of particular importance, for it attests a spontaneous effort to improve the efficiency 
of a custom. The authority’s intervention was sporadic but already present. It 
consisted in the approval of the redaction of the custom. Such approval may well be 
considered as a forerunner of modern authoritative law-making, held by 
contractualists as necessary and irreplaceable. 
The pitfalls in the evolution of spontaneous behaviours require the intervention of 
imposed law for efficiency’s sake. Imposed law solves such pitfalls through an 
instrument too often given for granted and so neglected: the publication of due 
behaviour. From the town crier of old to the modern Official Journals passing through 
the news-sheets, publication renders due behaviour both intelligible and uniform. 
When the number of agents increases too much, or their interactions become too fast 
and frequent, spontaneous coordination is too expensive and so inefficient. This is 
when imposed law takes over. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 British Library, MS Additional 48020, fol. 348v. 
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